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A Test of the Theory of DSS Design for User Calibration:
The Effects of Expressiveness and Visibility on
User Calibration
Brian M. Ashford
U.S. Army Logistics Management College
ashfordb@Lee.Army.mil
ABSTRACT
This paper reports a test of the theory of decision support
systems design for user calibration that compares the efficiency
of the visual computing paradigm with that of the conventional
text paradigm over varied levels of problem novelty. Perfect
user calibration exists when a user’s confidence in a decision
equals the quality of the decision. The laboratory study reported
here compared the effects on user calibration of problems
depicted either using a text paradigm or visual computing
paradigm. The results support the theory. When problems are
new and novel, visual depiction improves user calibration. As
problems became more familiar and problem novelty decreases,
no difference was found in user calibration between subjects
exposed to visibility diagrams and those exposed to a traditional
text paradigm.
INTRODUCTION
One’s belief in the quality of a decision influences the decision
selection process (Russo & Schoemaker 1992). Failure to
appreciate the quality of a decision can mean that good decisions
are not implemented or poor decisions are not properly hedged.
Although confidence, as discussed herein, is a subjective
prediction, in many situations its accuracy can be objectively
assessed. The best-known measure of the accuracy of one's
confidence in a decision is calibration, the correspondence
between one’s prediction of the quality of a decision and the
actual quality of the decision (Lichtenstein et al. 1982, Clemen
& Murphy 1990, Keren 1991). When this correspondence is
equal, and one’s decision confidence equals the quality of the
decision, calibration is said to be perfect. Perfect calibration is
indispensable when selecting a decision from among competing
alternatives (Russo & Schoemaker 1992).
The theory of decision support systems (DSS) design for user
calibration prescribes requisite DSS design properties needed for
users to realize the performance goal of perfect calibration
(Kasper 1996). Reviewed below, the theory asserts that a DSS
can engender perfect calibration to the extent that it contains
requisite properties of Expressiveness (expression of words,
phases, and audio ranging from, e.g., cryptic to
anthropomorphic), Visibility (visual icons, images, and
animation ranging from, e.g., realistic to abstract), and
Inquirability (investigative tools and styles ranging from, e.g.,
data-oriented servile to dialectic contrarian inquiry). The theory
further asserts that as problem novelty increases the effective
mix of three properties varies from expressiveness to visibility
to inquirability.
This paper reports a partial test of the theory of DSS design for
user calibration. The effects on user calibration of
expressiveness in the form of text and visibility in the form of
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diagrams were investigated at two levels of problem novelty.
Specifically, a laboratory study was conducted in which subjects
were exposed to logically identical sets of problems displayed
using either expressiveness text or visibility diagrams, and user
calibration was computed and compared for higher and lower
levels of problem novelty. The results show that the effects of
the instantiations of expressiveness and visibility on user
calibration varied as prescribed by the theory: visibility resulted
in significantly better user calibration when problem novelty
was higher, but there was no difference in user calibration
between visibility and expressiveness when problem novelty
was lower. In other words, visual computing had its greatest
impact on user calibration when problems were new and novel.
BACKGROUND
Differentiating confidence, trust, predictability, and decision
accuracy, Muir (1994, p. 1915, parenthetics added) states,
Predictability is a basis for trust (and confidence), which in turn,
is the basis for an operator (user/decision maker) to make a
prediction about the future behaviour of a referent. The
accuracy of that prediction may be assessed by comparing it
with the actual behavioural outcome. In addition, an individual
who makes a prediction may associate a particular level of
confidence with the prediction. Thus, confidence is a qualifier
which is associated with a particular prediction; it is not
synonymous with trust.
Realism in confidence is essential for good decisions; the
ruinous consequences of unrealistic confidence litter the
business decision-making landscape (Russo & Schoemaker
1992). Because action precedes outcome, confidence plays an
essential role in both selecting and implementing a decision
(Russo & Schoemaker 1992). The confidence ascribed to a
predicted outcome when compared to the accuracy of that
prediction measures the decision maker’s ability to calibrate his
or her ascribed confidence
Since its beginning, the primary goal of DSS has been to
improve decision quality (Keen & Scott Morton 1978).
Unfortunately, evidence suggests that existing DSS can produce
“illusory benefits” (Aldag & Powers 1986, Davis et al. 1991),
resulting in miscalibration, thereby distorting the decision
selection process. Thirty years ago, Chervany and Dickson
(1974, p. 1342, parenthetics added) recognized this when they
wrote, “Even though the . . .(decision aided) subjects (in their
study) did better, their increased average time and reduced
average confidence lead to the tentative conclusion that they did
not have a ‘handle’ on the problem.” By now, almost everyone
can recount from personal experience a situation where
computer-generated output produced an aura of exactness and
reliance bordering on blind acceptance, even in the presence of
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compelling evidence to the contrary. In these cases, user
calibration may be distorted by the design of the DSS.
Based on and paralleling human problem solving, memory
representation, and multiple intelligence theories (Kaufmann
1985; Helstrup 1987; Gardner 1993), Kasper (1996) proposed
the notion and detailed a theory of DSS design for user
calibration. His design theory prescribes requisite properties of
a DSS so the user/decision maker can achieve the goal of perfect
calibration. The theory asserts that a user/decision maker can
achieve the goal of perfect calibration to the extent that the DSS
possesses requisite properties of expressiveness, visibility, and
inquirability, and that the effective mix of these properties varies
with problem novelty.
The theory of DSS design for user calibration is a design theory
(Walls, et al. 1992). It posits a goal, perfect calibration;
properties, expressiveness, visibility, and inquirability; and the
interaction of these properties to achieve the goal, a mix of
expressiveness, visibility, and inquirability that varies
systematically with problem novelty.
Expressiveness recognizes that the tone and delivery of words
and phrases (written and audio) used in a human-computer
interface dialogue (ranging from cryptic to anthropomorphic,
from monotone and monotonous to melodic and overly
melodramatic) can affect people’s beliefs, perceptions, opinions,
and predictions. Visibility encompasses the icons, symbols, and
animation that promote discovery, comprehension, problem
solving and engender feelings (Card, MacKinlay, &
Shneiderman 1999, Gonzalez & Kasper 1997). Inquirability
captures the affects produced by actions and interactions with
the inquiring system, including scope and nature of dialectics
(Churchman 1971) and the restrictiveness and decisional
guidance
of
the
system
(Silver
1990).

Effects of Expressiveness and Visibility on User Calibration
improved decision quality. Commenting on their findings,
Bauer and Johnson-Laird suggested that in unfamiliar, novel
situations, diagrams have a beneficial effect on decision making.
Recently, Speier & Morris (2003) found that visual interface
users performed better when task complexity was high and their
subjective mental workload was less compared to users of a textbased interface. Extending these findings, the study reported
here considers the effect of visibility on user calibration and
whether this effect, if observed, varies with problem novelty.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN, RESEARCH METHOD AND
MEASURES
To investigate the hypothesis, a laboratory experiment was
conducted. The main effect studied was properties of DSS
dialogue design and the dependent variable was user calibration.
Specifically, the differential effect of expressiveness and
visibility on user calibration was investigated. The experimental
design included two different problems to increase the
generalizability of the findings and to build upon earlier related
research, in particular, that of Bauer and Johnson-Laird. Two
calculations of problem novelty, Higher and Lower, were
defined by dividing each subject’s responses into earlier and
later decisions, again based on the work of Bauer and JohnsonLaird. The treatments, measures, formula used to calculate user
calibration, and procedures used in the experiment are discussed
in detail below.
Treatments
The treatment combinations used in this study were borrowed
directly from those developed by Bauer and Johnson-Laird to
study deductive reasoning and inference. They developed two
logically identical problems presented either as text, a form of
expressiveness, or diagrams, a form of visibility. In the interest
of space, the reader is directed to Bauer and Johnson-Laird
(1993) for detailed descriptions of these treatment conditions.
To investigating the hypothesis posited here, subjects also
recorded their decision confidence in their selection.
Measuring User Calibration

F ig u re 1 L o c u s o f D S S D e s ig n f o r U se r C a lib r a t io n in R e la t io n t o P r o b le m N o v e lt y
( K as pe r 1 9 96 )

Depicted in Figure 1, the theory of DSS design for user
calibration posits that when problems are somewhat novel and
unfamiliar, Visibility is the primary contributor to perfect
calibration and Expressiveness and Inquirability play
important but lesser, supporting roles. As problems become
more familiar and problem novelty decreases, the theory posits
that the contribution of Expressiveness increases, equals, and
eventually exceeds Visibility as the primary contributor to user
calibration. Stated in the null form, it is hypothesized that:
H0: There is no difference in user calibration between subjects
exposed to Expressiveness and those exposed to Visibility at
higher and lower levels of problem novelty.
Larkin and Simon (1987) posited a beneficial role for visibility
in search, recognition, and inference processing, and, in
response, Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) studied the effects of
diagrams on inference and found that the use of diagrams

To measure user calibration requires selecting a method and
means for recording both decision quality and the subject’s
belief in the quality of each decision, a scoring rule and
procedure that discourage gaming so that subjects are
encouraged to honestly report their beliefs, and a formula for
calculating calibration. Each of these requirements is discussed
in the next sections.
Recording Beliefs And Decisions
Following convention in calibration research, subjects in this
study answered a series of multiple-choice questions by
reporting both their decision and confidence in the correctness
of each decision. Each subject answered a total of ten multiplechoice questions. The ten questions consisted of the four
questions used in the Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) study plus
six additional questions generated using the same truth table.
For each of these ten questions, the subject selected one
alternative as his or her choice as the correct alternative and then
assigned a confidence value to that alternative and other
alternatives as desired. Analysis of pilot study data showed that
assigning confidence values to multiple alternatives improved
user calibration; a finding consistent with that of Sniezek et al.
(1990).
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Recording Sales
Confidence is typically recorded on a scale ranging from 0 to 1
or some subset. In this study, this range was divided into
increments of five-hundredths (i.e., 0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15,..., 1.0)
because research suggests that this is consistent with the
respondent's “natural scaling” of decision confidence (Winkler
1971).
Scoring Rules
The purpose of a scoring rule is to encourage respondents to
honestly report their confidence in each decision by eliciting
values that reflect the respondent's actual belief in the quality of
his or her selection. For this to occur, a scoring rule must (1) be
understood by the subject so that its implications and the
correspondence between beliefs and numerical values can be
fully appreciated, and (2) maximize the subject’s expected total
score only when the subject reports values that correspond to his
or her actual beliefs (Stael von Holstein, 1970).
Assume that a subject's true decision confidence is expressed by
probability vector P = (p1, p2, ..., pn) for a mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive set of events, {E1, E2, ..., En}.
Assume further that the confidence values an assessor reports
are represented by R = (r1, r2, ..., rn). A proper scoring rule S
exists if S is maximized only when r = p. This requirement is
satisfied by only a very few somewhat complex scoring rules
that require the respondent to perform high level operations such
as exponential, root, or log calculations (Murphy & Winkler
1970). These complex operations make it almost impossible for
subjects to quickly compute and fully appreciate the
implications of their decisions and the correspondence between
their actual beliefs and the values they report. In other words,
these scoring rules confuse and may actually interfere with the
subject’s reporting values reflecting his or her actual beliefs.
A scoring rule that meets the criterion of understandability is the
well-known simple linear scoring rule Sk(r) = rk, where k refers
to the event that actually occurred and rk is the confidence
probability assigned by the subject to the kth response.
Unfortunately, in its simplest form, this scoring rule is not
strictly proper because S(r,p) = ∑pkrk is maximized by setting
one ri (i.e., the ri corresponding to the largest pi) equal to 1.0 and
the other ris equal to 0.0. If ri=k, then the subject appears to have
complete confidence in the answer that turns out to be correct.
On the other hand, if ri≠k, the subject appears totally wrong, but
losses nothing because the scoring rule imposes no penalty for
being wrong. In other words, a subject maximizes his or her
score by assigning a confidence of 1.0 to one answer despite his
or her true belief in the quality of any answer.
Despite this limitation, most calibration research has used some
variation of this simple linear scoring rule. In fact, comparing
three complex proper scoring rules to the simple linear scoring
rule, Rippey (1970) reported that the simple linear scoring rule
actually produced more reliable results. Likewise, reviewing a
number of these studies, Phillips (1970) concluded that the
complex proper scoring rules did not yield significantly different
values than those collected using a simple linear scoring rule,
but, as expected, subjects found simple linear scoring rules more
realistic and easier to understand.
Considering these tradeoffs, this study used a variant of the
simple linear scoring rule that discouraged gaming and guessing
by penalizing wrong answers. The scoring rule used here was:

S = rk - [(largest ri≠k)/2
where S is the score, k refers to the correct alternative, rk is the
confidence probability assigned to that alternative, and ri≠k are
the confidence probabilities assigned to the alternatives that turn
out to be incorrect. This variant of the simple scoring rule is
easily understood because its implications can be more readily
appreciated and the respondent can better understand the
correspondence between her beliefs and numerical values she
reports. Yet, subjects are encouraged to report numerical values
that correspond to their actual beliefs because of the penalty of
one-half the largest confidence value assigned to an alternative
that is wrong.
Computing Calibration
The

most

popular

calculation

for

calibration

is:

1 T
calibration = ∑ nt ( r t - ct )2
N t=1
where N is the total number of responses, nt is the number of
times the confidence value rt is used, ct is the proportion correct
for all items assigned confidence value rt, and T is the total
number of different response categories used (Lichtenstein &
Fischhoff 1977, Clemen & Murphy 1990). Using this formula,
perfect calibration is a score of 0.0. The worst possible score,
1.0, can only be obtained when the responses are completely and
consistently wrong; that is, rt = 1.0 is always assigned to the
wrong answer and rt = 0.0 is always assigned to the answer that
turns out to be correct.
Procedures
Subjects were recruited from students enrolled in upper-division,
undergraduate courses in information systems and psychology.
All participants volunteered for the study and were rewarded
course credit as required by American Psychological
Association guidelines (1992).
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned to one
combination of the two treatment levels, expressiveness or
visibility, and the two problems, so as to balance the number of
subjects in each cell of the experimental design. The subject
then read a two-page handout of instructions that included an
example of the expressiveness or visibility display, depending
upon the treatment condition assigned, and a description of the
navigation procedures and operations the subject would be using
to answer the multiple-choice questions. The instructions also
included a detailed discussion of the scoring rule, including a
table of all possible outcomes that could be referred to
throughout the study. The subject was then guided through a
demonstration, and questions regarding the procedures and
objectives of the study were answered. Each subject then
completed a consent form and a short, 11-item questionnaire
designed to collect descriptive demographic and background
data. To describe the groups’ visual acuity, the 16-question
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (Marks 1972, 1973)
was also administered. The subject then began answering the
ten questions presented as either visibility diagrams or
expressiveness text.
To minimize any question ordering effect, the ten questions in
each treatment combination were counterbalanced by order with
each question presented in each order position once. This
resulted in ten different primary orderings of the ten questions in
each treatment. Each question was displayed and data collected
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using Dell II machines with 17" monitors. The display used in
the study was written in ToolBook 5.0 by Asymetrix.
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A total of 54 students participated as subjects in the study. Forty
subjects, 10 in each group, completed all aspects of the
experiment, followed all the instructions and answered all the
questions. Although subjects were not given a specific time
restriction, on average, they took about 35 minutes to complete
all aspects of the study.
Seventy percent of the subjects in the study were information
systems majors and the remainder were psychology majors.
Most subjects were adult, non-traditional students reporting an
average age of 30.3 years. Forty-seven percent of the subjects
were female and 80 percent reported that English was their
native language. As a group, subjects also reported average to
above average (mean = 32.4; s.d. = 9.62) visual acuity as
measured by the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire and
self-reported “average” facility with logic and math problems.
Recall that each subject in each treatment answered ten
counterbalanced questions. The ten responses from each subject
were divided into the first four and the last six responses, again,
based on Bauer and Johnson-Laird’s research. A calibration
score was then computed for each of these two subsets for each
subject. These subsets defined the two levels of problem
novelty. Calibration based on the first four responses defined
the Higher category of Problem Novelty and calibration
computed on the subject’s last six responses defined the Lower
category of Problem Novelty.
Analysis of this data shows that the content of the problem,
electrical circuit or people and places, had no effect on either
percentage correct (questions 1-4, F(1,36) = .08, p = 0.7 and
questions 5-10, F(1,36) = .01, p = 0.9) or user calibration
(questions 1-4, F(1,36) = .07, p = 0.7 and questions 5-10, F(1,36) =
.01, p = 0.9), so the data was collapsed over the problem content
scenarios. In terms of percentage correct, these results are
identical to those found by Bauer and Johnson-Laird who also
collapsed the data over the same people-and-places and electric
circuit scenarios. The mean of user calibration of this pooled
data is shown for expressiveness and visibility for the two
Problem Novelty categories in Figure 4.
Focusing on the higher category of the Problem Novelty axis
shows that subjects using the visibility (V) treatment were much
better calibrated, had calibration scores closer to zero, than were
those assigned to the expressiveness (E) treatment. Conversely,
at the Lower category of Problem Novelty there seems to be
little difference between the average calibration of those
exposed to expressiveness (E) and those exposed to visibility
(V). In other words, over the last six questions, when decisions
were more familiar and less novel, exposure to visibility or
expressiveness did not differentially affected user calibration.
Figure 4 also shows that average user calibration for the
visibility (V) treatment was overall the best, closest to zero, at
the Higher category of Problem Novelty (.078). The next best
level of user calibration was at the visibility (V) Lower category
of Problem Novelty (.100). Comparing these results, the data
suggest that the same subjects exposed to the visibility (V)
treatment produced better user calibration in the first four tries
(.078), when problem novelty was highest, than they did over
the last six tries (.100) when problem novelty was lower.

F ig u r e 4
M e a n C a li b r a t io n o f E x p r e s s iv e n e s s ( E ) a n d V is ib i lit y ( V ) f o r H ig h e r a n d L o w e r
P r o b le m N o v e lty .

For expressiveness (E), the results in Figure 4 show that subjects
exposed to the expressiveness (E) treatment had on average
poorer calibration than did those exposed to visibility.
Expressiveness produced the poorest average user calibration at
both the higher and lower category of Problem Novelty (.163 &
.116). However, comparing the two expressiveness (E) bars
shows that there was a marked improvement in user calibration
from the Higher to the Lower category of Problem Novelty for
those exposed to expressiveness (.163 to .116). In this regard,
the change in user calibration for those exposed to the
expressiveness treatment was as might be expected, user
calibration improved as problem novelty decreased.
To assess the statistical significance of the differences in user
calibration suggested by the means depicted in Figure 4, a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was computed
using the two dependent variables, user calibration at the Higher
and Lower groupings of Problem Novelty, and the independent
variable of DSS Locus of Design, either expressiveness or
visibility, for each subject. This model produced a Wilks
Lambda treatment effect of F(2,37) = 2.8, p = 0.07. Although
insignificant at the α = 0.05 level, this result does not preclude
significant univariate effects. Indeed, in the case of strong
positive correlation between the dependent variables (r = 0.45, p
= 0.0031), and interaction consistent with that hypothesized in
Figure 1, the multivariate test is less powerful than it would be if
the data were negatively correlated (Bray & Maxwell 1988, pp.
31-32). In other words, the Wilks Lambda F-value may be
confounded by the nature of the interaction between dependent
variables.
1.a. ANOVA Results of User Calibration by Expressiveness and
Visibility for Higher Problem Novelty (questions 1-4).
Source
df
Type III SS
F-Value
P-Value
E/V
1
.073
5.232
.028*
Error
38
.528
Total
39
.601
R2 = 0.121; * p < .05
1.b. ANOVA Results of User Calibration by Expressiveness
and Visibility for Lower Problem Novelty (questions 5-10).
Source
df
Type III SS
F-Value
P-Value
E/V
1
.002
.229
.635
Error
38
.405
Total
39
.407
R2 = 0.006
Table 1: Analysis of Variance of User Calibration for Higher
(questions 1-4) and Lower Problem Novelty (questions 5-10).
To clarify the MANOVA results, analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was computed for the Higher and Lower groupings
of Problem Novelty separately. The results of these analyses are
presented in Table 1.
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The first ANOVA, Table 1a, shows results for data from the
higher category of Problem Novelty. These data show that
subjects exposed to visibility produced user calibration that was
significantly better than those subjects exposed to
expressiveness (F(2,37) = 5.23, p = 0.028). The Bonferroni
minimum significant difference of 0.0755 confirms that the
difference between 0.163 and 0.078 is significant at the α = 0.05
level. For this data, H0 can be rejected. The evidence shows
that for the higher category of Problem Novelty (i.e., when the
problems were the most novel), the average calibration of
subjects using visibility diagrams was significantly better than it
was for those subjects using expressiveness text.

and inquirability on user calibration at different levels of
problem novelty.

In contrast, results in Table 1b show no significant difference in
user calibration as a result of visibility and expressiveness
treatment levels (F(2,37) = .229, p = 0.635). The Bonferroni
minimum significant difference of 0.0661 exceeds the 0.016
difference in means (0.116 - 0.100). In this case, H0 cannot be
rejected. The data indicate that when problem novelty was
Lower and problems were more familiar and less novel, there
was no difference in user calibration between subjects using
visibility diagrams and those using expressiveness text.
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Though not related to the hypothesis, comparisons of visibility
(V) or expressiveness (E) across Higher and Lower levels of
Problem Novelty resulted in no significant differences.
Likewise, comparing visibility (V) at the Higher level of
Problem Novelty to visibility and expressiveness at the Lower
level of Problem Novelty resulted in no significant differences.
Analyses also showed no significant difference in user
calibration due to VVIQ subject differences (questions 1-4,
F(1,37) = 2.57, p = 0.12; questions 5-10, F(1,37) = .14, p = 0.71) or
decision time. These results add to the generalizibility of the
main finding that visibility improves user calibration when
problems are new and somewhat novel.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The results of a partial test of the theory of DSS design for user
calibration are reported. Specifically, a laboratory study was
conducted to compare the effects of expressiveness and visibility
on user calibration at two levels of problem novelty. The results
of this study support the theory. When problems were new and
novel, visibility diagrams significantly improved user calibration
compared to expressiveness text. Later, when problems became
more familiar, less novel, there was no difference in user
calibration between visibility and expressiveness.
Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) and Speier and Morris (2003)
report that diagrams improved decision quality. The results
reported here demonstrate that visibility diagrams also improve
user calibration. Together, these studies suggest that visibility
results in better decisions and decision makers are better
calibrated about their decisions. Specifically, when problems
are new and somewhat novel, visibility can both improve
performance and help decision makers assess their decision
performance, combining to improve user calibration and better
outcomes.
For researchers, these findings bode well for the continued
development of the DSS design theory for user calibration. To
the extent that DSS are applied in novel, one-shot situations, this
study demonstrates the importance of visibility in DSS design
for user calibration. This study also encourages more research
into the effects of different forms of expressiveness, visibility,

For builders and designers of DSS, these results clearly highlight
the importance of visibility to decision-making and user
performance, especially in new, novel decision environments.
This research also highlights the effects of interface design on
user calibration. In particular, the results of this research
establish the importance of visibility in DSS design, especially
for new and relatively novel decision situations.
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